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1. Although mutual options may be given the partners to purchase
or to liquidate upon the death of a partner, preferably the agreement should bind the decedent's estate to sell, and the survivor
to purchase.
2. The agreement should provide a clear and definite basis for
evaluating the decedent's interest.
3. The sale of the decedent's business interest should be restricted
to the other partners during life as well as at death.
4. The agreement must preclude the sale of any partner's interest
during lifetime at a price higher than that payable at death. It
should not be a substitute for testamentary disposition.
5. The agreement should reflect a "business purpose."
6. The wills of the partners should be consistent with the agreement and should direct the executors to carry out its terms.
JOHN J. DORTcH.
Torts-Application of Emergency Doctrine in North Carolina
The following charge by the trial court as it related to the application of the doctrine of "sudden emergency" was approved by the
North Carolina Supreme Court in a recent case:'
"The Court instructs you that a person confronted with a
sudden emergency is not held by law to the same degree of care
as in ordinary circumstances, but only to that degree of care
which an ordinarily prudent person would use under similar
circumstances. The standard of conduct required in an emergency, as elsewhere, is that of a prudent person.
The Court further instructs you that this principle is not
available to one who by his own negligence, brought about or
contributed to the emergency. That means, in simple language,
that a person who creates an emergency, or contributes to it,
cannot take advantage of the principle.
The Court further instructs you that one who is required
to act in an emergency is not held by law to the wisest choice
of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of ordinary care
and prudence similarly situated would have made."
The purpose of the doctrine of sudden emergency has been well
stated by the West Virginia court :2
"The general principles which require one to act in such a
manner as to avoid injury to himself, and to take such steps to
(1954).
S. E. 2d IBarnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N. C. 721, 724, 20ldfield v. Woodall, 113 W. Va. 35, 37, 166 S. E. 691, 692 (1932).
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avoid accidents as would be taken by a reasonably prudent person under like circumstances, are not enforced in all their rigor
as to situations of sudden danger. This is a recognition of the
fallibility of human nature in sudden crises and the greater probability of errors of judgment occurring when a danger is eminent and where a person is compelled instantly, without delaying
for deliberation, to adopt some course of conduct to avoid injury."
The purpose of this note is to discuss the application of the doctrine
of emergency in North Carolina from three aspects, namely:
(1) What is the nature of the peril necessary to invoke the doctrine ?
(2) Is the availability of the doctrine affected by how or by whom
the emergency was created?
(3) Is it a question of law for the court or fact for the jury as
to whether the doctrine of emergency is available, and as to whether
the person invoking the doctrine acted so as to free himself of negligence?
Nature of the Peril
Authorities seem to be split on the question of whether the danger
necessary to invoke the doctrine of emergency be real3 or only apparent to the person so imperiled. 4 The North Carolina Supreme
Court has never decided the question directly. 5 However, in two
cases, the court quoted with approval a Massachusetts case which
applied the apparent peril test in determining whether the doctrine
of emergency was available. As thus applied, the test is:
3Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d 164 (4th Cir. 1937); McLaren v.
F. Bird Inc., 296 Ill. App. 345, 15 N. E. 2d 993 (1938); Trudeau v. Sina Con, 62 N. W. 2d 492 (1954) ; Roby v. Auker, 149 Neb.
tracting Co., Minn. 734, 32 N. W. 2d 491 (1948); Lubliner v. Ruge, 21 Wash. 2d 881, 153 P. 2d
694 (1944); Hill v. Walters, 55 Wyo. 334, 100 P. 2d 98 (1940).
' Palma v. Moren, 44 F. Supp. 704 (M. D. Pa. 1942); Hooper v. Bronson,
123 Cal. App. 2d 243, 266 P. 2d 590 (1954); Budds v. Keeshin Motor Express
The above cases apply the
Co., 326 Ill. App. 59, 61 N. E. 2d 579 (1945).
subjective test in determining whether there was an apparent danger. The following cases-apply the objective test and hold that the apparent danger must
be a reasonable one: Southwestern Freight Lines v. Floyd, 58 Ariz. 249, 119
P. 2d 120 (1941) ; Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942)
(reasonably well founded) ; Allen v. Pearce Dental Supply Co., 149 Kan. 549, 88
P. 2d 1057 (1939) (reasonable to a person ordinarily prudent); Higgins v.
Terminal Ry. Association of St. Louis, 231 Mo. App. 837, 97 S. W. 2d 892
(1936) (reasonably well founded); Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., 114
N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio App. 1953), appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St. 571, 117 N. E.
2d 439 (1954) (reasonable apprehension).
'In Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 838, 178 S. E. 587, 591 (1935), the
court approved a charge in which the trial court charged the jury using the
term "apparent peril." It is noted, however, that this point in the charge was
not the one to which exception was taken on appeal, so the case is probably
not authority for saying that North Carolina recognizes the apparent peril
doctrine.
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"If the peril seemed imminent, more hasty and violent action
was to be expected than would be natural at quieter moments,
and such conduct is to be judged with reference to the stress of
appearances at the time, and not by the cool estimate of the
actual danger formed by outsiders after the event." 6
It would seem, therefore, that if the question were ever squarely up
for decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court would probably decide that apparent danger is sufficient to allow the invoking of the
doctrine. It also seems that the court would require that this apparent peril must be a reasonable one. It is not enough if the person
attempting to invoke the doctrine of emergency thought he was in an
emergency when a reasonably prudent person so situated would not
have thought so. The requirement that the apprehension be a reasonable one has been applied in North Carolina in the field of assault. 7
It should be equally applicable here, for it would prevent false claims
of emergency by one attempting to overcome the charge of negligence.
Cause of the Emergency
There is also a split of authority as to the origin of the emergency
necessary to allow the doctrine to be invoked. Some jurisdictions hold
that in order for the plaintiff to take advantage of the doctrine, the
emergency must be created by the wrongful conduct of the defendant.8
Other jurisdictions hold that the doctrine is not available to one who
creates the emergency,9 whereas the majority hold that it is available
unless the emergency is negligently or willfully created by the one
invoking it."0
'Gannon v. R. R., 173 Mass. 40, 41, 52 N. E. 1075 (1899), quoted with
approval in Mills v. Waters, 235 N. C. 424, 426, 70 S. E. 2d 11, 12-13 (1952),
and Ingle v. Cassiday, 208 N. C. 497, 499, 181 S. E. 562, 563 (1935).
' State v. Williams, 186 N. C. 627, 120 S.E. 224 (1923). The test as applied
is that if a person, by a display of force, causes another to reasonably apprehend imminent danger, and thereby forces him to do otherwise than he would
have8 done, he commits an assault.
Hedgecock v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942); Lee v. City
Ice Co., 64 S. W. 2d 736 (Mo. App. 1933); Helvich v. George A. Rutherford
Co., 114 N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio App. 1953) appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St. 571,
117 N. E. 2d 439 (1954). The above cases hold that the emergency must be
created by the negligence of the defendant in order for the plaintiff to invoke the
doctrine; but the doctrine should be even more applicable if the conduct creating'
the emergency was willful.
'C. J. Peck Oil Co. v. Diamond, 204 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1953); Fagan
Elevator Co. v. Pfiester, 244 Iowa 633, 56 N. W. 2d 577 (1953) ; Metzinger v.
Subera, 175 Kan. 542, 266 P. 2d 287 (1954) ; Meistinsky v. City of New York,
12810N. Y. S. 2d 483 (1954).
Kisor v. Tulsa Refining Co., 113 F. Supp. 10 (W. D. Ark. 1953) (negligently created) ; Leo v. Dunham, 41 Cal. 2d 712, 264 P. 2d 1 (1953) (negligently created) ; Puza v. Hamway, 123 Conn. 205, 193 A. 776 (1937) (negligently
created) ; Wallace v. Kramer, 296 Mich. 680, 296 N. W. 838 (1941) (negligently created) ; Trudeau v. Sina Contracting Co., Minn. -,
62 N. W. 2d
492 (1954) (failure to use ordinary care); Spalt v. Eaton, 118 N. J. Law. 327,
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The last view seems to adopt the better reasoning, since the purpose
of the doctrine is to make allowances for one who is momentarily
incapable of deliberation. Therefore, it is only the incapacity to deliberate which should be considered, not its origin, unless this incapacity was negligently or willfully produced in whole or in part by
the person attempting to profit by it. North Carolina, in applying the
doctrine, takes the majority view, for it has prohibited the application
of the doctrine only in those cases where the party who seeks to invoke
it has negligently or willfully contributed in bringing it about.11 In
Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. McLean Trucking Co., 12 the court held
that the benefit of sudden emergency is available to the defendant unless
the emergency is produced or contributed to by his negligence. It
seems to follow that the doctrine would be available if the emergency
were created by some outside force, or by a third party. North Carolina so held in Goode v. Barton.'3
It is noted that the charge of the trial judge in the principal case
first correctly stated the law to be that the doctrine of emergency is
not available to one who negligently contributed to it. He then, in attempting to explain, further said:
"That means, in simple language, that a person who creates
an emergency or contributes to it, cannot take advantage of the
principle." 14
The latter part of this charge seems to be in error, for one may create
ati emergency and still avail himself of the doctrine if the creation
were not negligent or willful. The North Carolina Supreme Court
apparently concluded that the jury was not misled by the latter phrase,
and that the doctrine had been sufficiently explained to them.
Fact or Law
The majority view in this country is that whether an emergency
existed is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury,15 but if the facts
192 A. 576 (Sup. Ct. 1937) (tortious); Feuquay v. Echer, 195 Okla. 285, 157
P. 2d 745 (1945) (negligently created); Moore v. Meyer and Power Co., 347
Pa. 152, 31 A. 2d 721 (1943)

117 Vt. 525, 97 A. 2d 250 (1953)
'Atlantic

(negligently created); Stevens v. Nurenburg,

(at fault).

Coast Line R. R. v. McLean Trucking Co., 238 N. C. 422, 78 S.E.

2d 159 (1953) ; Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S.E. 2d 664 (1951) ; Sparks
v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 44 S.E. 2d 343 (1947); Hoke v. Greyhound Co., 227
N. C. 412, 42 S.E. 2d 593 (1947). In Powell v. Lloyd, supra at 488, 67 S. E.
2d at 668, the dissenting justice said: "The rule of sudden emergency cannot be
invoked by one who has brought that emergency upon himself by his own
wrong or who has not used due care to avoid it."
12238 N. C. 422, 78 S. E. 2d 159 (1953).
13238 N. C. 492, 78 S.E. 2d 398 (1953).
In this case the emergency was
created by a severe ice and snow storm.
" Barnes v. Caulbourne, 240 N. C. 721, 724, S. E. 2d (1954).
" DePonce v. System Freight Service, 66 Cal. App. 2d 295, 152 P. 2d 234

(1941); Pollard v. Weeks, 60 Ga. App. 644, 4 S.E. 2d 722 (1939); Hedgecock
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are not in dispute, it becomes a question of law for the court. 16 Whether
a person acting in the emergency was acting as a reasonably prudent
person .would have acted under the same or similar circumstances is
likewise for the jury.17 The North Carolina Supreme Court early
applied the doctrine that the question of negligence in an emergency
is one for the jury.' 8 It would appear that such a rule might be applied
with reasonable consistency, but a brief reiew of several cases will
show the inconsistency with which the doctrine has been applied in
North Carolina.
In Ingle v. Cassiday,'9 the court, in upholding an involuntary nonsuit, held as a matter of law that an emergency faced the defendant,
and that he acted as a person of ordinary care and prudence, similarly
situated, would have acted. This case was decided over the vigorous
dissent of Mr. Justice Clarkson.2 The case marked the beginning of
decisions in which the court has seemingly abandoned the principle
that the determination of the existence of an emergency, and the determination of whether there was negligence under the doctrine, are
questions for the jury.
In Mills v. Waters,21 the court upheld a nonsuit by holding, as a
matter of law, that the defendant was faced with an emergency and
that he acted prudently thereunder. It seems that in this case there
was sufficient evidence to go to the jury had the court not entered
v. Orlosky, 220 Ind. 390, 44 N. E. 2d 93 (1942); Baker v. Shettle, 194 Md.

666, 72 A. 2d 30 (1950); Kinder v. Erie R. Co., 109 N. J. Law. 469, 162 A.

387 (1932); Helvic v. George A. Rutherford Co., 114 N. E. 2d 514 (Ohio
App. 1953), appeal dismissed 160 Ohio St 571, 117 N. E. 2d 439 (1954) ; Vogreg
Wash. - , 268 P. 2d 642 (1954). In
v. Shepard Ambulance Service, Baker v. Shettle, supra at 671, 172 A. 2d at 32, the court said, "It is held by
the weight of authority, that if there is evidence in a case legally sufficient to
show
1 0 that an emergency existed, it becomes a question of fact for the jury."
Helvich v. George A. Rutherford Co., supra note 15.
Kirk v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 833, 161 P. 2d 673, 164 A. L. R.
1 (1945) ; Schultz v. Chicago, R. I. and P. R. Co., 167 Kan. 228, 205 P. 2d 965
(1949); Pampu v. City of Detroit, 315 Mich. 618, 24 N. W. 2d 588 (1946);
St. Johnsburg Trucking Co. v. Rollins, 145 Me. 217, 74 A. 2d 465 (1950);
Schultz v. Meyerholtz, 91 Ohio App. 566, 109 N. E. 2d 35 (1951); Litz v.
Zoeller, 365 Pa. 45, 73 A. 2d 387 (1950); Reddick v. Longacre, 228 S. W. 2d
264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) ; Frenier v. Brown, 116 Vt. 538, 80 A. 2d 524 (1951) ;
American Products Co. v. Villwock, 7 Wash. 2d 246, 109 P. 2d 570, 132 A. L. R.
1010 (1941).
18 Bullock v. Williams, 212 N. C. 113, 193 S. E. 170 (1937); Jernigan v.
Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178 S. E. 587 (1935); Smith v. Atlantic and Yadkin
Ry. Co., 200 N. C. 177, 156 S. E. 508 (1931); Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N. C.
266, 136 S. E. 726 (1927); Clark v. Wilmington and Weldon R. R. Co., 109
N. C. 430, 14 S. E. 43 (1891). In Bullock v. Williams, supra at 117, 193 S. E.
at 172, the court approved the charge of the trial judge that the determination
is ordinarily one for the jury.
10 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935).
" Mr. Justice Clarkson in his dissent in Ingle v. Cassiday, supra note 19, at
page 500, 181 S. E. at 564, stated that "the defense of sudden emergency is one
holding among American courts."
for the jury. This is the universal
21235 N. C. 424, 70 S. E. 2d 11 (1952).
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a nonsuit under the emergency doctrine.
Here the court said that
it gave due consideration to the cases holding that weight and sufficiency of the evidence are for the jury.
In Henderson v. Henderson,23 the court said:
"Viewing the circumstances in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, as required in passing upon a motion for judgment of
involuntary nonsuit, the defendant was confronted suddenly by
an emergency caused solely by the gross negligence of (third
party)....

... and his failure to anticipate the unforeseeable when confronted by a sudden emergency caused by no fault of his own
cannot be deemed a basis of actionable negligence."
In this case, the court affirmed a dismissal of the suit at the conclusion
of the plaintiff's evidence.
The practice of upholding nonsuits on the ground that the defendant
was under an emergency and acted prudently thereunder as a matter
of law is not unusual in North Carolina.2 The cases in which the
court has applied the majority view and allowed the jury alone to
decide these issues seem to be in the minority. 25 The court has also
reversed nonsuits against the plaintiff on the ground that the evidence

26
indicated the plaintiff to be acting in an emergency.
In spite of the apparent failure of the North Carolina Supreme
Court to follow consistently any rule as to whether the questions relating to an emergency should go to the jury, it is still possible to
make several observations which may be of some help to attorneys
in unravelling this dilemma.
(1) Is seems evident that if the person attempting to invoke the
doctrine wins a jury verdict, this verdict will probably not be disturbed on appeal on the ground either that he was not faced with an
emergency, or if an emergency, that he was negligent. In other words,

22 In this case the defendant attempted to sweep spilled gasoline out of a
service station. During the sweeping motion, some of the gasoline came in
contact with an open stove, whereby the plaintiff was burned.
23239 N. C. 487, 492, 80 S. E. 2d 383, 386 (1954).
2
Henderson v. Henderson, supra note 23; Morgan v. Saunders, 236 N. C.
162, 72 S. E. 2d 411 (1952); Mills v. Waters, 235 N. C. 424, 70 S. E. 2d 11
(1952); Ingle v. Cassiday, 208 N. C. 497, 181 S. E. 562 (1935). In Patterson
v. Ritchie, 202 N. C. 725, 164 S. E. 117 (1932), the court went to the extreme
by reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that the defendant
was confronted by a situation in which he had to act quickly, and under the
circumstances he was not negligent, but rather acted prudently.
2 Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938); Jernigan v. Jernigan, 207 N. C. 831, 178 S. E. 587 (1935).
" Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N. C. 481, 67 S. E. 2d 664 (1951); Wall v. Bain,
222 N. C. 375, 23 S. E. 2d 330 (1942) ; Harper v. Construction Co., 200 N. C.
47, 156 S. E. 137 (1930).
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the court probably would not reverse a jury verdict by holding as a
matter of law that there was no emergency, or that the party did not
act prudently in the emergency.
(2) If the defendant invokes the doctrine as a defense to a charge
of negligence, and the trial court nonsuits the plaintiff on the ground
that there was an emergency, and that the defendant was not negligent
under the emergency as a matter of law, the chances are very strong
that the nonsuit will be affirmed on appeal.
(3) If the defendant invokes the doctrine, and the case goes to
the jury which decides for the plaintiff, the supreme court may sustain or reverse, depending on whether it thinks, as a matter of law,
that the defendant's actions were prudent under the emergency.
Conclusion
It would seem that the most logical way to apply the doctrine of
emergency would be:
(1) If there is any evidence that would support a finding that
an emergency existed, then the question of the existence of the emergency should be determined by the jury.
(2) If it is determined that an emergency did exist, the question
of whether a person acted during the emergency as a reasonably prudent person similarly situated would act should always be submitted
to the jury. It is submitted that the amount of care required in an
emergency is never a question of law. To determine the amount of
care required to find one free of negligence, it is first necessary to
determine how great an emergency existed, and to what extent
the emergency destroyed the prudence which would otherwise
be displayed by the person involved or by the reasonably prudent
person. The determination of these questions in themselves, under
any conditions, is a determination as to which reasonable men may
differ, therefore requiring submission to the jury.
Thus, under the above, a nonsuit could never be predicated or sustained on the ground that the defendant was faced with an emergency
and acted prudently thereunder. Nor could a jury verdict be upset on
the basis of an emergency, because it would have to be assumed that
the jury considered the emergency question in reaching its verdict.
It is submitted that the application of the above conclusions would
help to alleviate the inconsistencies which are now present in the application of this phase of the law of negligence in North Carolina.
ROBERT

C.

BRYAN.

